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Abstract
Actors of public interest today have to fear the adverse impact that stems from social media
platforms. Any controversial behavior may promptly trigger temporal, but potentially devas-
tating storms of emotional and aggressive outrage, so called online firestorms. Popular tar-
gets of online firestorms are companies, politicians, celebrities, media, academics and
many more. This article introduces social norm theory to understand online aggression in a
social-political online setting, challenging the popular assumption that online anonymity is
one of the principle factors that promotes aggression. We underpin this social norm view by
analyzing a major social media platform concerned with public affairs over a period of three
years entailing 532,197 comments on 1,612 online petitions. Results show that in the con-
text of online firestorms, non-anonymous individuals are more aggressive compared to
anonymous individuals. This effect is reinforced if selective incentives are present and if
aggressors are intrinsically motivated.
Introduction
Collective online aggression directed towards actors of public interest is an increasing phenom-
enon. While various types of social media have been involved in such online firestorms (e.g.
content communities such as YouTube), blogs and social networking sites such as Facebook
are outstanding triggers [1]. In 2011, Christian Wulff, the former federal president of Germany,
was accused of corruption–claims that afterwards were rejected as unfounded although they
promptly led to his resignation. The Wulff-affair was massively amplified by the negative
word-of-mouth dynamics in social media. In 2013, the company Amazon was accused of the ill
treatment of temporary workers. The Amazon-affair led to floods of negative comments on
Amazon’s Facebook profile. Firestorms also shake academia: In 2011, the former minister of
defense of Germany, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, was accused of plagiarism. These accusa-
tions triggered widespread online debates and ultimately led to the denial of his PhD and to his
resignation.
The examples illustrate how online aggression has emerged from the private niche of limited
email bullying to a publicly visible and relevant phenomenon. Dependent on the focus of the
underlying research, the phenomenon of aggressive, offensive and emotional commenting in
social media has been labeled flaming, cyberbullying, online harassment, cyber aggression,
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electronic aggression, toxic online disinhibition, trolling or, if the aggression resembles crowd-
based outrage, online firestorms [1–5]. In online firestorms, large amounts of critique, insulting
comments, and swearwords against a person, organization, or group may be formed by, and
propagated via, thousands or millions of people within hours [1]. Social media enable these
unleashed phenomena [2, 3, 6]. They allow attacking everywhere at anytime with the potential
for an unlimited audience. They raise the likelihood for hostile misinterpretations due to lim-
ited discursive action and social media’s absence of nonverbal cues. They reduce the risk for
feedback reactions because users can “sneak off” after the aggressive act.
The phenomenon of online aggression is not well understood despite the great deal of atten-
tion on hostile behavior in social media in both the mainstream media and the empirical litera-
ture [2, 7–16]. Most contributions are descriptive and are conducted largely in the absence of
theories [2, 15]. If contributions refer to theories they are mainly guided by traditional bullying
research theory, more precisely by the massive amout of existing research concerned with
cyberbullying among adolescents. Within this view, online aggression is understood as an irra-
tional and illegitimate behavior that is caused by underlying personality characteristics, such as
a lack of empathy and social skills, narcissism, impulsivity, sensation seeking, emotional regula-
tion problems or psychological symptoms such as loneliness, depression, and anxiety [15, 17].
Traditional bullying research theory, however, misses the point that in online firestorms,
aggression happens in public, and not in private, social networks.
It therefore seems questionable whether bullying research theory is transferable to online
firestorms. For example, a strong and commonly shared assumption within bullying research
theory is that anonymity, understood as the degree to which a communicator perceives the
message source as unknown and unspecified, promotes aggression through decreased inhibi-
tions [3, 18–21]. For online firestorms it suggests that negative, and particularly aggressive,
word-of-mouth propagation in social media will weaken if real-name policies are introduced.
In this article we show that this assumption is not necessarily true because the reverse effect
can be obtained: Individuals have a strong motivation for being non-anonymous when being
aggressive in social media. We explain this behavior pattern by social norm theory. Social
norm theory may be a more appropriate theory to understand communication behavior in
social media and to draw conclusions, for example, that real-name policies will not weaken
online firestorms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section introduces social norm
theory to understand aggressive behavior in a social-political online setting, and develops
hypotheses. The subsequent sections explain the dataset, the measurements and the method,
and present the empirical findings. We conclude with a discussion of the findings, research
limitations and suggestions for further research.
A social norm theory on online firestorms
Social norms are fundamental to human behavior [22, 23]. Former literature defines norms as
statements “that something ought or ought not to be the case” ([24] page 132), as institutional-
ized role expectations [25], or as becoming apparent if behavior attracts punishments [26]. In
general, norms are mental representations of appropriate behavior in society and smaller
groups and, consequently, guide the behavior of individuals. Norms that are characterized as
social “must be shared by other people and partly sustained by their approval and disapproval”
([23] page 99). Social norms are created intentionally because they promote the provision of a
public good that benefits a collective, for example less pollution in a neighborhood due to less
burning of leaves [27], less harm to health through cessation of smoking [28], or more fairness
through income differentials [29, 30]. The public good view does not automatically imply that
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social norms are always beneficial for all persons concerned. In fact, many social norms exclude
certain groups from public goods because they promote the interest of one subgroup, i.e., they
serve “functions of inclusion and exclusion” ([23] page 108). For example, peer-group norms
aim to strengthen cohesion within the group by offering group privileges [23, 31].
To be sustainable, social norms need to be enforced, otherwise Olson’s [32] zero contribu-
tion holds: “if all rational and self-interested individuals in a large group would gain as a group
if they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to
achieve that common or group interest” ([32] page 2). Social norms are enforced by simple
sanctions which trigger feelings of guilt and shame in the case of internalized social norms.
Consequently, the mere expectation of sanctions, in turn, supports the enforcement [23].
Enforcement also happens through actual bilateral and multilateral costly sanctions where
those who cause negative externalities are confronted with punishments and normative
demands [28, 33]. Linked to Olson’s [32] zero contribution, norm enforcement itself is a sec-
ond-order public good: self-interested and utility-maximizing individuals do not naturally con-
tribute to norm enforcement and may prefer free riding [28, 33]. Ostrom [34] however stresses
how, in practice, contextual variables and the engagement of certain types of individuals deter-
mine whether collective action and cooperation is enhanced or discouraged. Similarly, Ellick-
son [35] emphasizes how norms may emerge or shift dependent on cost-benefit conditions or
group composition. Also the presence, salience, or strength of social ties can explain individual
variation in social-political engagement [36, 37]. For example, diffuse networks of weak bridg-
ing ties encourage mobilization through communicative advantage [38]. Specifically, research
shows that Olson’s [32] second-order public good dilemma can be overcome if (1) norm
enforcement is cheap, i.e., it occurs in low cost situations [27, 39], (2) additional benefits are
provided to the norm enforcers that disproportionately motivate them compared to non-
enforcers, i.e., selective incentives are present [28, 32] and/or (3) if some individuals are present
that are intrinsically motivated to enforce norms, i.e., some amount of altruistic punishment
occurs [40–42]. In the following we elaborate these three conditions for social media to explain
the phenomenon of online firestorms.
Online firestorms within a social norm theory
Aggressive word-of-mouth propagation in social media is the response to (perceived) violating
behaviors of public actors. Public actors include, for example, politicians who disregard politi-
cal correctness norms, corporations that violate human rights, or academics who violate scien-
tific norms by engaging in plagiarism. In this view, online firestorms enforce social norms by
expressing public disapproval with the aim of securing public goods, for example, honesty of
politicians, companies or academics. The stunning waves of aggression typical for online fire-
storms can be explained by the characteristic features of social media that ideally contribute to
the solution of the second-order public good dilemma of norm enforcement. Digital norm
enforcement in social media is cheap, and selective incentives and intrinsically motivated indi-
viduals are present.
In social media, sanctioning norm violations occurs in low-cost situations. The basic idea of
the low-cost hypothesis is that attitudes or preferences are more likely to guide individual
behaviors when norm enforcement behavior is relatively cheap [27, 39, 43]. Evidence in various
research fields supports this basic tenet (for an overview see [43]). For example, the voting par-
adox [32], i.e., the fact that citizens participate in elections even though they are aware of the
marginal influence of their vote, is often explained by referring to the low-cost hypothesis [44].
In social media, a number of factors contribute to such low-cost situations. First, social media
mobilize former free riders because online criticism is monetarily inexpensive, hardly time-
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consuming and can be performed anywhere and anytime, compared, for example, to elaborate
street protests [1, 2]. One example is the limited message length in the social media platform
Twitter, which obliges communication to be short and quick. It is less astonishing that Twitter
has been involved in most of the recent cases of online firestorms [1]. Second, in social media,
people who are geographically completely removed from each other can assault each other ver-
bally without fear of bodily harm. Nonverbal cues such as facial expression and physical size
are lacking, thus reducing the empathy of the aggressor and the impact of authority of the vic-
tims typically expressed by dress, body langugage, and social setting [2, 3, 45]. Third, social
media give ordinary people the power to communicate (perceived) norm violations to a very
large audience [46, 47]. The internet re-creates village-like interconnectedness within a global,
pluralistic society by crossing local, or even national, boundaries due to unrestrained informa-
tion flow [48]. To compare, while aggressive norm enforcement is a rare behavior in the non-
digital context (Brauer and Chekroun [49] found that max. 4% of bystanders aggressively sanc-
tion daily deviant behavior by insulting or aggressive shouting), we should observe it more fre-
quently in the digital social media context for the reasons given above.
Hypothesis 1. Provided that a social-political issue finds its way into social media plat-
forms, online aggression takes place more frequently than in the non-digital context because
sanctioning of (perceived) norm violations occurs in low-cost situations.
In social media, selective incentives that benefit a latent group of norm enforcers are dispro-
portionally present [28, 32]. Individuals only bear the costs of norm enforcement if the poten-
tial benefits of their actions exceed the costs [50]. Selective incentives translate resentment for
norm breaching into action in situations where it is unclear whether a necessary critical mass
of other norm enforcers will join the action. In such situations, cost sharing cannot be expected,
nor can clear benefits from norm enforcement, such as an actual behavioral change by the
accused person or organization, be predicted. In the case of selective incentives, individuals
participate in collective action in response to salient private benefits [51]. Whether individuals
are able to reap selective incentives is dependent on the issue at stake and on certain individual
or group characteristics. Social media contribute to the presence of selective incentives by
enhancing the salience of private benefits. In social media, for example, highly controversial
topics are debated. Social media are, in addition, highly influenced by the multiplication of
cross-media dynamics, for example by public scandals taken up or created by news media lead-
ing to comments in social media. Broad public discussions and connections to public scandals
give credible signals that a norm infringement at the expense of a latent interest group–be it the
group an individual belongs to or identifies with–has occurred [52].
Hypothesis 2. Online aggression in social media is encouraged by salient selective incen-
tives, for example, in highly controversial topics or in topics connected with public scandals.
Social media ensure that a high amount of intrinsically motivated actors are present. Indi-
viduals engage in costly norm enforcement if they have an intrinsic desire to “make the world a
better place” [53–55]. This type of norm enforcement has been intensively discussed as “altru-
istic punishment”, i.e., individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and
yields no material gain [42]. Altruistic punishment is driven by strong negative emotions
towards the norm defector [40, 41, 56] and by people’s perception of a state of affairs as illegiti-
mate [57–61]. Strong intrinsic motivation, however, is only likely to encourage participation if
it is reinforced by organizational or individual ties [37]. This requirement is given in the infra-
structural setting surrounding online firestorms. The technical mechanisms of social media
such as newsletters, newsgroups, followers, or social media sharing ensure that intrinsically
motivated individuals are optimally informed about cases that, in their view, represent offenses
against existing social norms. Beyond this, they provide opportunities to tackle these norm vio-
lations by commenting on them.
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Hypothesis 3. Intrinsically motivated actors encourage online aggression in social media.
The non-anonymity of negative word-of-mouth dynamics in social media
In social media, people can hide or alter their identity. They may either comment by providing
no name or at least not their real name, i.e., a (random or stable) pseudonym. Existing litera-
ture on online behavior hypothesizes that such online anonymity is one of the principle factors
that decreases inhibitions, increases self-disclosures and therefore promotes online aggression
[3, 18–21]. This causal mechanism is also assumed by social media consultants who attempt to
explain online firestorms [62].
In general, anonymity produces the “stranger on a train” phenomenon, wherein people
share intimate self-disclosures with strangers as they do not expect a reunion and hence do not
fear any risks and constraints [63]. To that effect, “when people have the opportunity to sepa-
rate their actions online from their in-person lifestyle and identity, they feel less vulnerable
about self-disclosing and acting out” ([3] page 322). With regard to heightened aggression and
inappropriate behavior, psychosocial motives exist for being anonymous [19]. Anonymity first
detaches from normative and social behavioral constraints [64]. Second, it allows to bypass
moral responsibility for deviant actions [3]. Third, it reduces the probability of social punish-
ments through law and other authorities [20]. Fourth, it triggers an imbalance of power which
limits the ability of the victim to apply ordinary techniques for punishing aggressive behavior
[65]. Fifth, it gives people the courage to ignore social desirability issues [3] and finally, it
encourages the presentation of minority viewpoints or viewpoints subjectively perceived as
such [66–70].
Former research has concluded that the possibility for anonymity in the internet fosters
aggressive comments. It is assumed that online aggression is driven by lower-order moral ideals
and principles and, consequently, people feel ashamed to aggress under their real names. How-
ever, the empirical evidence for such a link is scarce and no definitive cause-effect relationship
has evolved. Studies suggest that anonymity only increases online aggression in competitive sit-
uations [71], that anonymity does not increase online aggression but does increase critical
comments [72], or that the effect of forced non-anonymity on the amount of online aggression
is a function of certain characteristics of user groups, e.g. their general frequency of comment-
ing behavior [73].
The former conceptualization of online aggression is rather narrow, in particular for aggres-
sion in social media. According to social norm theory, in social media, individuals mostly use
aggressive word-of-mouth propagation to criticize the behavior of public actors. As people
enforce social norms and promote public goods, it is most likely that they perceive the behavior
of the accused public actors as driven by lower-order moral ideals and principles while that
they perceive their own behavior as driven by higher-order moral ideals and principles. From
this point of view there is no need to hide their identity.
Furthermore, aggressive word-of-mouth propagation in a social-political online setting is
much more effective if criticism is brought forward non-anonymously. This is due to the fact
that non-anonymity inceases the trustworthiness of the masses of weak social ties to which we
are linked, but not necessarily familiar with, in our digital social networks. Trustworthiness of
former firestorm commenters encourage us to contribute ourselves. First, non-anonymity is
more effective as the credibility of sanctions increases if individuals use their real name [70,
74]. Anonymity makes “information more suspect because it [is] difficult to verify the source’s
credibility” ([70] page 450). This removes accountability cues and lets one assume that individ-
uals present socially undesirable arguments [74, 75]. Second, the views of non-anonymous
individuals are given more weight: “Just as people are unattached to their own statements
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when they communicate anonymously, they are analogously unaffected by the anonymous
statements of others” ([69] page 197). Anonymous comments have less impact on the forma-
tion of personal opinions [69, 76], on the formation of group opinions [74], and on final deci-
sion making [77]. Third, anonymity lowers the identification with, support of, and recognition
by, kindred spirit [78]. In anonymous settings, individuals cannot determine who made a par-
ticular argument, how many different people expressed similar arguments, whether a series of
arguments are all coming from the same person, or the degree to which other commenting
individuals are similar to oneself [74, 79–81]. Anonymity filters out cues that communicate
social identity, cues that are necessary to characterize comments by others [74, 82], to identify
with individuals in social comparison processes [74] and to coordinate group interactions [80].
Finally, anonymity reduces the benefit to be positively evaluated by others [83, 84]. Studies
show that exclusively anonymous conditions induce little mobilization because anonymity
excludes the benefit of recognition by others [85].
From a social norm point of view, the arguments suggest that aggressive word-of-mouth
propagation in a social-political online setting takes place non-anonymously. People have a
strong feeling to stand up for higher-order moral ideals and principles. Commenting anony-
mously is a costly, wasteful behavior, as sanctions are less credible, create less awareness, less
support and offer few benefits. These considerations make particular sense in the usual setting
of firestorms, namely social media where usually, weak social ties are clustered around ideolog-
ically like-minded networks. Such networks likely support non-anonymous aggressive sanc-
tions that confirm their worldview.
Hypothesis 4. In a social-political online setting, non-anonymous individuals, compared
to anonymous individuals, show more online aggression.
As stated earlier, norm enforcement is fostered if selective incentives and intrinsically moti-
vated actors are present. Consequently if social norm theory is an appropriate theory for online
aggression in a social-political online setting, these groups in particular should give more
weight to the benefits of non-anonymous aggressive word-of-mouth propagation. Simulta-
neously, they give less weight to potential risky consequences such as being subject to deletion,
banned from websites, formally convicted by the accused actor for defamation of character
and/or damage to reputation, or informally sanctioned by social disapproval from online or
offline individuals [86].
Hypothesis 5. In a social-political online setting, in situations that offer selective incen-
tives, compared to situations without selective incentives, more online aggression by non-
anonymous individuals is observed.
Hypothesis 6. In a social-political online setting, intrinsically motivated aggressors (i.e.
aggressive commenters), compared to aggressors without intrinsic motivation, show more
online non-anonymous aggression.
Materials and Methods
Sample
We test the hypotheses with a census of a major social media platform concerned with public
affairs. We analyze all comments on online petitions published at the German social media
platform www.openpetition.de between May 2010, the launching of the online portal, and July
2013. Online petitions exemplarily include protests against pay-scale reform of the German
society for musical performing and mechanical reproduction rights called GEMA (305,118
signers), against the enforcement to finance public service media (136,010 signers), against the
closing of the medical faculty at the University Halle (58,577), or for the resignation of an Aus-
trian politician (9,196 signers) or the Bavarian minister of justice (6,810 signers). Online
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petition platforms seem very suitable to investigate the phenomenon of negative word-of-
mouth in a social-political online media setting. First, online petitions are concerned with pub-
lic actors and public affairs, for example, internet security, misbehavior of firms, politicians, or
academics, public spending, tax issues, animal protection, etc., and thus provide a central loca-
tion where public norms are negotiated. Second, online petition platforms are prototypical
social media platforms: everybody is allowed to participate and create content for any kind of
topic, and the debates and comments are publicly visible. Third, qualitative evidence suggests
that many popular firestorms have been triggered or have been surrounded by online petition
platforms, for example the Deutsche Telekom firestorm in 2013, or the firestorm leading to the
displacement of the German Federal President Christian Wulff in 2011. Fourth, online petition
platforms are concerned with real-life cases. Many former studies are based on artificial labora-
tory experiments to study negative word-of-mouth behavior on the internet. Finally, online
petition platforms cover a wide range of public issues and affairs, implying lower selection
biases as compared to case studies about online firestorms (such as in [1]).
The final dataset includes 532,197 comments on 1,612 online petitions. There were a total
of 3,858,131 signatures over the 1,612 petitions between 2010 and 2013, with detailed informa-
tion about the wording of the comment, the commenters, the signers and the petition. The
dataset was provided to the authors in an anonymous form by the platform owner. For each
signer and commenter, however, the dataset indicated whether he/she had originally contrib-
uted anonymously (= 1) or non-anonymously (= 0). For this study, no approval of any ethics
committee was sought because all data are publicly accessible on www.openpetition.de and no
names of signers or commenters can be tracked and identified in the dataset. In order to pre-
pare the dataset in accordance with our theory, we rely on a mixed-method big-data approach.
For many variables we use a qualitative approach to arrive at meaningful quantitative
measurements.
The present dataset allows us to exclude two biases which, in other studies, frequently affect
findings on relations between anonymity and aggression. First, there was no active intervention
in the ratio of anonymous and non-anonymous aggressive comments in the dataset. In the
period of data collection, the platform owner did not moderate the comments on his own initia-
tive. However, he reacted by deleting selected inappropriate comments when the user community
reported them. According to the platform owner, a deletion was independent of whether the
inappropriate comment was provided anonymously or not, as he explicitly considered this differ-
ence as irrelevant to liability issues. Second, we may also exclude any bias stemming from differ-
ing legal jurisdictions: Potential legal implications for identified aggressors are the same across
the entire study. In Germany, the jurisdiction on defamation and insult is part of the federal law
[87], i.e., as the entire study pertains to the same legal jurisdiction, all defamatory or aggressive
commenters across all German states face the same potential costs for their actions.
Measurement of Variables
Wemeasure online aggression in the following manner. In general, inconsistency in the opera-
tionalization of online aggression dominates research [88]. Operationalization includes impo-
lite statements, swearing, flirting, exclamations, expressions of personal feelings, use of
superlatives [89] to profanity, typographic energy (e.g. exclamation marks), name calling,
swearing, and general negative effect [72, 88]. We rely on the definition of online aggression in
firestorms, i.e., large amounts of critique, insulting comments, and swearwords against a per-
son, organization, or group formed by, and propagated via, social media platforms [1]. Accord-
ingly, we measure online aggression by direct offenses within the comments on online
petitions (e.g. “I hate GEMA, complete morons and exploiters”, ID469090), swearwords (e.g.
Digital Norm Enforcement in Online Firestorms
PLOSONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923 June 17, 2016 7 / 26
“Fuck that Shit!”, ID477368), and expressions of disgust or contempt (e.g. “The deportation
policies of German authorities is commonly a disgusting, repulsive and inhuman mess!”,
ID418089). Expressions of disgust and contempt are typical responses to morally offensive
behavior [90]. Importantly, even from the outside perspective, we confidently evaluate these
expressions to be intended as aggression. This is because we do not expect close relationships
or shared, subcultural interactional norms between the commenter and the targeted actor in
petitions, in contrast to profane language between friends representing covert closeness and
not aggression [91].
To systematically collect online aggression, we compile a list of frequently used swearwords
from synonym reference books and online databases of swearword collections (e.g. http://
www.schimpfwoerter.de/). This approach corresponds to previous studies that count aggres-
sive postings by using a pre-defined set of aggressive words (such as in [73]). Then, we disag-
gregate the 532,197 comments into single words and count them. Frequently occurring words
are manually checked and classified as online aggression if applicable. Subsequently, we
exclude all words that can be used for different meanings, for example, as swearwords or as
terms for animals. These steps led to a final list of 1,481 words that express offenses, swear-
words, and disgust. Using this final list of aggressive expressions, we count the amount of
online aggression in each comment. Subsequently we qualitatively check the appropriateness
of our approach by comparing subsamples of comments with our quantitative measurement.
We take the logarithm added by 1 to create an approximate normal distribution of the variable.
Independent variables. Anonymity is measured in the following way: Before online users
sign a petition and subsequently formulate a voluntary comment, they are requested to provide
their real names and addresses. In regard to public visibility, they are given the choice to allow
their real name to be published or to remain anonymous, i.e., only the postal code is visible to
other users (0 = non-anonymous, 1 = anonymous). Although the theoretical possibility of
using pseudonyms does exist, we expect that commenters’ incentive for pseudonyms is low.
This is because anonymity complies with the hidden name option and petition organizers may
classify the signature of pseudonyms as invalid.
Controversy that accompanies a petition is measured by the level of debate. Each petition
provides the opportunity to start a debate on the petition homepage, a tool used in most peti-
tions by supporters and opponents. A debate is structured by denoted pro- and contra-argu-
ments, i.e., by arguments that underpin or oppose the petition’s concerns. Only arguments that
differ in their content from formerly mentioned arguments are additionally incorporated.
Within the pro- and contra-sections, commenters are allowed to oppose arguments by adding
sub-replies (pro-reply-/contra-reply-arguments). More controversial topics lead to a higher
diversity of pro-, contra-, pro-reply- and contra-reply-arguments. Thus, to measure contro-
versy, we construct a Herfindahl index by taking the percentage of arguments within each cate-
gory, i.e., pro-/contra-/pro-reply-/contra-reply-arguments, squaring it, adding them together
and subtracting the final result from 1. The index measures the controversy that surrounds the
topics of petitions from no controversy (= 0) to a maximum of controversy (= 1).
To identify scandals, we measure whether the accusation against an actor forwarded by a
petition, for example corruption of a politician, is covered and framed as scandal by traditional
news media (1 = yes / 0 = no). We define keywords that describe the content and concerns of
the petition. In the database LexisNexis we search for whether these keywords are associated
with the term “scandal” in the German-speaking media within a time period of one year before
the starting date of each petition.
To measure actors’ intrinsic motivation, we operationalize fairness perceptions of commen-
ters. We compile a list of 579 expressions frequently used in ideological discourses that indicate
fairness issues, for example, expressions such as “injustice” or “unfair”. In addition, we use
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synonym reference books and databases, manually check frequently occurring words within
comments and exclude ambiguous words. For each commenter we count the amount of intrin-
sic motivation by taking the sum of fairness words in the comment. We take the logarithm,
added by 1, to create an approximate normal distribution of the variable.
Control variables. We control for factors that influence the amount of online aggression.
The length of comment is measured by the total number of words in a comment. Longer
comments are more likely to entail more aggression.
The time period between opening a petition and submitting a comment is included because
the time point of comment submission may influence commenters’ level of aggression. Aggres-
sion may either take place in the very beginning, because most signatures and comment activity
in petitions are submitted within the first days [92], or alternatively, in advanced stages, in the
case where a petition experiences a boost due to revived public debate. We measure how many
minutes after petition opens that a comment has been submitted.
The number of protesters having signed is included because larger protests are likely to
attract more online aggression. We measure how many individuals sign a particular petition
and consequently match this data with the comments on a certain day. The median of protest-
ers amounts to 76 signers per day with a maximum of 2,926 signers per day. We take the loga-
rithm of the number of protesters to create an approximate normal distribution of the variable.
The status of the accused may also influence online aggression. Theoretically, public actors
with a high social status may be either protected from sanctions as they have more resources to
reply to punishments by even more painful punishments, or, to the contrary, they can attract
sanctions because they are also more vulnerable than lower status actors [93]. In practice, high
status celebrities or politicians may also refrain from suing laypersons as it is counterproduc-
tive to their reputation. To take these complex influences into account, we control for the status
of the accused. As a proxy for social status of the accused public actors, we collect the number
of Google hits for the accused’s name (1 =<1000; 2 =<10,000; 3 =<100,000; 4 =<500,000; 5
=<1,000,000; 6 =>1,000,000). Google hits tend to reflect social status. To decrease measure-
ment errors, for example due to actors sharing the same name, we additionally check whether
the accused is listed in the German online encyclopedia Wikipedia (0 = no entry, 1 = entry in
article’s subtitle, 2 = entry as main article). Wikipedia exclusively lists actors with a minimum
public status. We add both variables and take the logarithm of the mean value.
We measure also whether the accused is a natural person or a legal entity. Legal entities pro-
fessionally monitor the internet for defamation and gather more resources to fight accusations
than do natural persons. To avoid that commenters anticipate differing costs for their aggres-
sive behavior dependent on whom the accused actor is, we control for this factor. Two indepen-
dent coders manually check whether the target is a natural person such as a scientist or
politician (= 1) or a legal entity such as a government or an organization (= 0). In 4% of the
petitions, the target is a natural person and not a legal entity.
The anonymity of the social environment of commenters measures the anonymity of the
environment in which commenters live. This may influence how much aggression is expressed
[94]. Less anonymous villages with tight social control likely increase sanctioning costs. As a
proxy for the anonymity of commenters’ social environment, we measure the size, i.e., the
number of inhabitants, of the city or village in which commenters live. The postal codes of each
signer are aggregated such that individuals living in the same city or village are merged. The
dataset includes 23,977 cities and villages. We count the number of signers for each city or vil-
lage, and by random checking, we find that the correlation of the number of signers within a
postcode region, and the de facto size of this region, is 0.92, validating our proxy. We allocate
the size of residence variable to all signers and commenters. Bigger values indicate that com-
menters originate from more anonymous environments.
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The regional scope of a protest is measured because issues of broad public relevance may
attract more aggression. We measure the regional diversity of a petition by constructing a Her-
findahl index ranging from no regional diversity (= 0) to a maximum of regional diversity (=
1). Signers are assigned to different German federal states on the basis of residential postal
codes. We take the percentage of signers within each federal state, square it, add them together,
and subtract the final result from 1.
The success of a petition is measured because successful petitions potentially deal with more
relevant topics, which may indirectly influence the amount of online aggression. A petition is
considered successful if the petition initiator defines the petition goals to be achieved in full or
at least in part (1 = yes; 0 = no).
The petition motive may influence the amount of online aggression. Using a petition’s title
and leading text, two independent coders classify the petitions with regard to their underlying
motives by using the classification by Reiss [95]. Five major concerns are identified, namely
idealism/fairness (42%), income/costs (19%), security/social order (13%), autonomy/self-deter-
mination (14%), and quality of life/competences (52%). Multiple assignments of petitions are
possible. Idealism/ fairness serves as the reference group in the regression models.
Similarly, the petition topic may influence anonymity considerations and the amount of
aggression. Depending on the societal area, be it the economy, politics, or culture, accused
actors may differ in their thresholds of wanting to sue aggressive online commenters. Com-
menters may anticipate these thresholds and the related differing costs of being aggressive.
This in turn affects commenters’ actual behavior. Using a petition’s title and leading text, two
independent coders classify the petitions with regard to their underlying topics using the func-
tional systems of a society [96]. Six major topics are identified, namely society (41%), arts
(20%), economics (13%), politics (8%), media (8%), and environment and animal protection
(8%). Multiple assignments of petitions are avoided. Society, including topics such as sport or
solidarity, is the most general category and serves as reference group in the regression models.
For the summary of the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of the former vari-
ables, see S1 Table.
Methods
We apply random-effects and fixed-effects models to predict online aggression in petitions (for
access to data, syntax, and Permission for using data of openpetition.de, see the Data availabil-
ity statement). In both models the comments are grouped on the petition level. The random-
effects model keeps within- and between-petition variation in the analysis. We assume that
petitions vary not only within, but also between, each other, for example because some peti-
tions have many supporters while other petitions have only a few supporters, or because of dif-
ferences in the underlying goals and motives. We analyze whether online aggression within
and between petitions changes when other variables within and between the petitions change.
The fixed-effects model keeps only within-petition variation in the analysis. We also analyze
whether the aggression within petitions changes when other variables change, for example the
anonymity of commenters, the amount of intrinsic motivation or the amount of selective
incentives within the petitions. Many variables of our dataset are time-invariant, i.e., constant
petition features that do not vary on the petition level. In the fixed-effects model these variables
are omitted. Both models have advantages as well as disadvantages. The fixed-effects model
excludes all random noise between the petitions and is therefore often preferred as the golden
standard. However, differences between the petitions, for example the number of supporters,
may also be important in explaining negative word-of-mouth behavior within petitions. This
speaks in favor of the random-effects model. We therefore apply both models and compare the
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results. We additionally run alternative conceivable models for the data structure, for example,
logistic regression, Poisson regression, or negative binomial regression for panel data, as our
dependent variable is (if not transformed) a count variable, or can be transformed into a binary
variable that indicates whether a person is an aggressor or not. The results are similar with the
results that follow and will therefore not be presented here.
Results
In accordance with Hypothesis 1, the data substantiate that online aggression in social media is
a more frequent phenomenon than in the non-digital context. In the analyzed online petition
platform we find 197,410 aggressions according to our definition. 20.62% of all comments
entail a minimum of one aggressive expression (Fig 1). In 9% of all comments we find two, up
to fifteen, aggressive expressions. On the petition level, only 11% of all petitions include no
aggressions. 34% include a negligible amount of aggressions from 1, up to 10. 37% include 11
up to 100 aggressions. 16% include 101 up to 1,000 aggressions. 2% include 1,001, up to 25,360,
aggressions. Even if the prevailing majority of commenters make no use of aggressive language
in social media, the numbers demonstrate that online aggression occurs not only in a vanishing
minority of comments or petitions (compared to the observed vanishing minority of max 4%
of bystanders aggressively sanctioning in the non-digital context [49]). This supports the claim
that in social media, aggressive sanctioning behavior is a relatively frequent phenomenon
because it takes place in low-cost situations.
We now move to the presence of selective incentives and intrinsically motivated actors in
social media. The descriptive findings show that 47% of all petitions are accompanied by a
highly controversial debate, 6% of the petitions are associated with a scandal in news media,
Fig 1. Observed amount of online aggression per comment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.g001
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and 26% of the commenters are motivated by fairness concerns. Social media thus indeed seem
to offer an environment in which the second-order public good dilemma of norm enforcement
can be overcome. Whether these conditions indeed contribute to norm enforcement is tested
in Tables 1 and 2.
The random-effects model in Table 1, Model 1, confirms that situations that offer selective
incentives, i.e., a petition is accompanied by a highly controversial debate or is connected with
a scandal in news media, significantly encourage online aggression in comments. This prelim-
inarily supports Hypothesis 2 (for the size of the effects see Figs 2 and 3). The fixed-effect
model in Table 2 entails no results for selective incentives because petition-invariant effects are
dropped. Further, the random-effects as well as the fixed-effects models in Tables 1 and 2,
Table 1. Predicted amount of online aggression dependent on the anonymity of aggressors (random-effects regression).
Model 1 Model 2
Y: Amount of online aggression (log) Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z|
Anonymity -.02 .00 -13.10 *** .00 .00 -.35
Controversy of accusation .04 .01 4.45 *** .05 .01 4.86 ***
Accusation is connected to a scandal .02 .01 2.16 * .03 .01 2.38 *
Intrinsic motivation (log) .01 .00 12.17 *** .02 .00 12.15 ***
Anonymity x Controversy -.02 .01 -3.01 **
Anonymity x Scandal -.01 .00 -3.00 **
Anonymity x Intrinsic motivation -.01 .00 -3.19 **
Length of comment in words .00 .00 114.09 *** .00 .00 114.13 ***
Time of comment after petition opening .00 .00 -3.31 ** .00 .00 -3.30 **
Number of protest participants (log) .00 .00 -.35 .00 .00 -.33
Scope of protest .03 .01 3.38 ** .03 .01 3.39 ***
Success of the petition .01 .01 .71 .01 .01 .70
Status of the accused (log) .00 .01 -.38 .00 .01 -.43
Accused is a natural person (vs. legal entity) .05 .01 4.03 *** .05 .01 4.03 ***
Anonymity of social environment of aggressors (log) .00 .00 -5.69 *** .00 .00 -5.68 ***
Motives: Income/minimization of costs -.01 .01 -1.28 -.01 .01 -1.30
Motive: Security/social order/traditional values .01 .01 1.29 .01 .01 1.29
Motive: Independence/self-determination .00 .01 .05 .00 .01 .05
Motive: Increasing life quality and competence -.06 .01 -8.65 *** -.06 .01 -8.69 ***
Topic: Art/culture/education -.01 .01 -1.25 -.01 .01 -1.26
Topic: Economics .02 .01 1.97 * .02 .01 1.98 *
Topic: Politics .00 .01 .13 .00 .01 .15
Topic: Media .05 .01 4.01 *** .05 .01 4.01 ***
Topic: Environmental and animal welfare .05 .01 4.37 *** .05 .01 4.40 ***
Constant .06 .02 3.88 *** .06 .02 3.70 ***
Number of observations 532196 532196
Number of groups 1568 1568
R-square (between) 12.69% 12.70%
Wald chi2 15031.07 *** 15066.10 ***
Legend
†< p .1
*< p .05
**< p .01
***< p .001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.t001
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Model 1, preliminarily support Hypothesis 3: online aggression is encouraged by intrinsically
motivated actors as compared to individuals without fairness concerns (for the size of the
effects see Figs 4 and 5).
Building on the view that social media today are a major channel for digital social norm
enforcement, which until now is not rejected by the data, Hypothesis 4 assumes that online
aggression takes place non-anonmously. Aggressive commentors have nothing to hide: they
stand up for higher-order moral ideals and principles. The goal of norm enforcement can be
reached most effectively if sanctions are forwarded non-anonymously because they are credi-
ble, create awareness, support, and offer benefits. The descriptive statistics show that only
29.2% of all commenters prefer to remain anonymous. Anonymity of commenters is thus a
Table 2. Predicted amount of online aggression dependent on the anonymity of aggressors (fixed-effects regression).
Model 1 Model 2
Y: Amount of online aggression (log) Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z|
Anonymity -.02 .00 -13.14 *** .00 .00 -.29
Controversy of accusation (drop.) (drop.)
Accusation is connected to a scandal (drop.) (drop.)
Intrinsic motivation (log) .01 .00 11.79 *** .02 .00 11.82 ***
Anonymity x Controversy -.02 .01 -3.07 **
Anonymity x Scandal -.01 .00 -3.00 **
Anonymity x Intrinsic motivation -.01 .00 -3.18 **
Length of comment in words .00 .00 114.00 *** .00 .00 114.04 ***
Time of comment after petition opening .00 .00 -3.63 *** .00 .00 -3.64 ***
Number of protest participants (log) .00 .00 -.31 .00 .00 -.29
Status of the accused (log) (drop.) (drop.)
Scope of protest (drop.) (drop.)
Success of the petition (drop.) (drop.)
Accused is a natural person (vs. legal entity) (drop.) (drop.)
Anonymity of social environment of aggressors (log) .00 .00 -5.79 *** .00 .00 -5.77 ***
Motives: Income/minimization of costs (drop.) (drop.)
Motive: Security/social order/traditional values (drop.) (drop.)
Motive: Independence/self-determination (drop.) (drop.)
Motive: Increasing life quality and competence (drop.) (drop.)
Topic: Art/culture/education (drop.) (drop.)
Topic: Economics (drop.) (drop.)
Topic: Politics (drop.) (drop.)
Topic: Media (drop.) (drop.)
Topic: Environmental and animal welfare (drop.) (drop.)
Constant .11 .00 33.16 *** .11 .00 32.90 ***
Number of observations 532196 532196
Number of groups 1568 1568
R-square (within) 2.70% 2.70%
F-value 2449.47 *** 1636.62 ***
Legend
†< p .1
*< p .05
**< p .01
***< p .001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.t002
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characteristic feature of social media; however, a vast majority still comments under their real
names. The results in Tables 1 and 2, Model 1, show the impact of commenters’ anonymity to
predict online aggression in comments. In line with Hypothesis 4, both the random-effects and
fixed-effects models show that more online aggression is obtained by non-anonymous com-
menters and not by anonymous commenters.
Exemplarily, we present three of the most aggressive comments by non-anonymous com-
menters: “Silly, fake, inhuman and degrading, racist, defamatory and ugly theses like those of
Sarrazin (author's note: a former German politician) have no place in this world, let alone in
the SPD (author's note: Social democratic party). Sarrazin certainly has no business in the
Social democratic party and should try his luck with the Nazis” (ID352216); “HC Strache
(author's note: Austrian politician) has an evil, inhuman character, he lies and tries to persuade
other people of wrong ideas.” (ID284846); “These authorities are mostly no people, but §§§-
and regulatory machines! I detest authorities–with my 67 years’ life experience after all!”
(ID418089).
Figs 6 and 7 illustrate the size of the effect as predicted in the random- and fixed-effects
regressions. The average effect of anonymity on aggression becomes sharper in the fixed-effects
model. The random-effects model additionally illustrates that many of the very aggressive com-
menters appear non-anonymously. Overall, the effect size is small. However, the data clearly
show that social norm enforcement, and not as popularly assumed, the risks of detection,
seems the major motivation for aggression in social media because persons often aggress under
their real names.
If norm enforcement is indeed the major motivation for aggression in social media, the
highest amount of non-anonymous negative word-of-mouth should be obtained in situations
Fig 2. Online aggression dependent on controversy and anonymity (random-effects). Predictions of
Table 1, Model 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.g002
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that offer selective incentives and for intrinsically motivated actors. Model 2, in Tables 1 and 2,
tests this assumption by introducing interaction effects between the anonymity of commenters
and the presence of selective incentives and their intrinsic motivation. The results give prelimi-
nary support for Hypotheses 5 and 6. The highest amount of non-anonymous aggression is
observed if a petition is accompanied by a highly controversial debate, is connected with a
scandal in news media, and if persons are motivated by fairness concerns. By introducing these
interaction effects, the main effect of anonymity on online aggression becomes insignificant,
and thus suggests that the underlying reasons for non-anonymous aggression can be indeed
explained by social norm theory, namely by selective incentives and intrinsic motivation.
Figs 2 and 8 illustrate the effect for the level of controversy within a debate. In the case of
highly controversial topics, individuals clearly prefer to aggress non-anonymously, indicating
that selective incentives are present (we code debates as highly controversial if the Herfindahl
index is higher than 0.3, and as less controversial if the Herfindahl index is 0.3 or smaller). Figs
3 and 9 illustrate the effect for the connection with a scandal in news media. Particularly for
scandalized topics, the biggest gap arises between the aggression of non-anonymous and anon-
ymous commenters, with the former showing more aggression. Again it supports that scandals
offer selective incentives for norm enforcement. Finally, Figs 4 and 5 illustrate the effect for
intrinsically motivated individuals. Intrinsically motivated individuals clearly prefer to aggress
non-anonymously.
With respect to the control variables, the results show that longer comments and comments
submitted earlier in the process of a petition entail a significantly higher amount of aggression.
The daily number of protesters has no effect on the amount of aggression, rejecting the
assumption that larger petitions attract more negative word-of-mouth. Online aggression
Fig 3. Online aggression dependent on scandal and anonymity (random-effects). Predictions of
Table 1, Model 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.g003
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significantly increases for geographically dispersed protests, indicating more general relevance,
and for natural persons. Individuals show more online aggression if they live in small villages
and cities. We can only speculate about the reasons for this unexpected finding. One explana-
tion is Putnam’s [97] hypothesis that suggests that political participation, and thus also norm
enforcement in social media, decrease in large, anonymous regions with a low amount of social
capital. Petitions that deal with quality of life entail a significantly lower amount of aggression,
whereas petitions that deal with the economy, the media, and environmental or animal welfare
entail a significantly higher amount of aggression.
Overall, the random-effects model predicts online aggression by 13%, suggesting that 36%
of the variance of aggression can be explained. The fixed-effects model, in which the predictive
power is always substantially lower, predicts online aggression by 3%, suggesting that 16% of
the variance of aggression can be explained. The predictive power of both models seems rather
moderate. One should, however, bear in mind that the predictions are based on objective data,
thus implying that common-method biases (and thus systematic-error variance) are absent.
Discussion
In online firestorms, large amounts of critique, insulting comments, and swearwords against
actors of public interest are propagated in social media within hours. This article begins the
investigation on this rather new phenomenon by introducing a novel view on online aggression
in social media. Relying on social norm theory, we proposed and demonstrated that one major
motivation for online aggression in social media is the enforcement of social norms, be it, for
example, the struggle for social justice by insulting greedy managers and politicians, or the
Fig 4. Online aggression dependent on intrinsic motivation and anonymity (random-effects).
Predictions of Table 1, Model 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.g004
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angst about foreign infiltration by hate speeches against migrants. Norm enforcers punish
actors of public interest who cause negative externalities for society or their sub-group by nega-
tive word-of-mouth. The technical conditions in social media, such as enhanced visibility and
lowered sanctioning costs, have contributed to the expansion of bilateral and multilateral
aggressive sanctions which can lead to firestorm-like patterns. Based on this theoretical
conceptualization, we also underpinned that online anonymity does not promote online
aggression in the context of online firestorms. There are no reasons for anonymity if people
want to stand up for higher-order moral principles and if anonymity decreases the effectiveness
of sanctions for norm enforcement.
By showing this, we hope to make a number of valuable contributions to the field of online
aggression in social media. First, online aggression in a social-political online setting is not pri-
marily an illegitimate and irrational behavior, performed by narcissistic and impulsive actors
with a lack of empathy, social skills and emotional regulation problems acting out of personal
revenge (such as in [5, 13]). Online aggression in social media resembles a practice of sousveil-
lance [98]: it accomodates a growing digital civil society that actively uses the available masses
of weak ties in social media to publicly enforce social-political norms. Social norm theory offers
a theoretical foundation for research on online aggression, which up to now has been largely
driven by the absence of theory or psychological interpretations of traditional bullying theory
(for example [15]). Second, it is one of the first studies that has investigated the role of ano-
nymity for online aggression in a social-political online setting by relying on a large dataset
that is representative of the proposed digital civil society, i.e., commenters who actively contrib-
ute to a wide range of social-political norm enforcement (see also [73]). Third, we challenged
Fig 5. Online aggression dependent on intrinsic motivation and anonymity (fixed-effects). Predictions
of Table 1, Model 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.g005
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the popular claim that negative word-of-mouth in social media is mainly caused by commen-
ters’ anonymity. In contrast, the results support the idea that non-anonymous aggressive sanc-
tions are more effective. Non-anonymity helps to gain recognition [78], increases one’s
persuasive power [74], and mobilizes followers [85]. The result is also in line with public voices
that observe an increasing social acceptance of non-anonymous digital hate speeches [99].
This study also has practical implications. First, it can be expected that in the future, digital
norm enforcement will intensify. The growing digital civil society adapts to the digital environ-
ment that transforms interactions. Social media offer great opportunities for individuals who
have the intrinsic desire to enforce norms and contribute to the formation of latent interest
groups. Second, the regularly demanded abolition of online anonymity and the introduction of
real-name policies do not necessarily prevent online aggression in social media. Our view is in
line with findings from a natural experiment in South Korea where the enacting of a Real
Name Verification Law in 2007 only reduced aggressive comments for a particular user groups,
but not for others [73]. There is, however, no doubt that the battle over online anonymity will
intensify over time, particularly when aggressive norm enforcement by the civil society not
only addresses low status, but increasingly high status, actors such as states or corporations.
This study has several limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
First, the findings are only generalizable to direct, explicitly abusive online aggression but not
to indirectly formulated aggression such as cynicism. Also, while we qualitatively checked com-
ments in our large dataset, it was not feasible to identify all comments. The amount of aggres-
sion in some comments may be therefore wrongly classified.
Fig 6. Online aggression dependent on anonymity of commenters (random-effects). Predictions of
Table 1, Model 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.g006
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Second, in strict terms, the anonymity option of the petition design restricts the generaliza-
tion of our findings to anonymity hidden from the internet community but not from the peti-
tion organizers. However, we consider the transferability to differing anonymity contexts as
justified. This is because we do not refer to “true anonymity”, but to “relative anonymity”, i.e.,
exploring why spontaneous commenters decide between common options of (non-)anonymity
offered for selection by most social media platforms. Achieving true anonymity, in contrast, is
difficult anyway: although we recognize that there may be a minority of protesters providing
pseudonyms and/or using Tor browsers to hide their identity from petition organizers, and
their true anonymity, e.g. to national security agencies, may still not be granted. Consequently,
we do not make any inferences on aggressive tendencies by “truly” anonymous commenters
because we cannot trace true anonymity and we also expect that the greatest majority of com-
menters fall back on common (non-)anonymity options.
Third, the results may be not completely transferable to all other types of social media such
as criticizing Amazon on Amazon’s Facebook fan page. Preexisting norms of cooperation
within online petition platforms may lower the expected cost of sanctions. If an aggressive
commenter is confronted with a diffuse mass of weak but supportive social ties, he more likely
reveals his identity compared to a setting of oppositional ties that could rebuke him, or strong,
influential ties that could control inappropriate language.
Fourth, the empirical design does not allow us to draw conclusions with respect to cause-
and-effect interpretations. By alternative designs such as most suitably field experiments or
intervention studies, it could be analyzed whether the decision to comment (non-)anony-
mously is indeed driven by social norm deliberations.
Fig 7. Online aggression dependent on anonymity of commenters (fixed-effects). Predictions of
Table 2, Model 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.g007
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Fifth, more information about the protesters and norm violators would be desirable, such as
information about their motivation or their socio-demographic characteristics. Exploring
whether aggressive protesters differ from non-aggressive protesters on particular dimensions
would be of interest here. In regard to aggressors’ motivations, another fundamental problem-
atic remains: To what proportion does firestorm-like outrage reflect genuine public opinion?
And to what extent does it represent auto-generated propaganda of political (ro-)bots or astro-
turfers, i.e., fake commenters paid by central coordination units such as political parties? Par-
ticularly if public actors increasingly give in to social pressures triggered by firestorms,
distinguishing between democratic expression of a legitimate peer-group and a swarm of bots
or astroturfers becomes increasingly difficult. Although we perceive the occurrence of bots
within our petition data as low (because the lists of signatures finally given to the addressee of
the petition had to include all names and home addresses of signers), this is a challenge that
public actors and researchers are likewise confronted with.
While we introduced social norm theory to understand online aggression in social media,
many open questions remain. A largely unexplored area is the effectiveness, or offline impact,
of digital social norm enforcement. Are there digital accusations that are systematically often ill
founded, or mostly justified? Also, beyond knowing that aggressive norm enforcers prefer non-
anonymity, how often and under what circumstances do non-anonymous aggressive sanctions
indeed help to mobilize other actors and to enforce social norms? Beyond this individual level
of analysis, we also recommend focusing on the collective level. A first point is to study, in
more detail, the role of selective incentives for (latent) group formation and aggressive acts in
social media. Can alternative methods and applications confirm that latent groups aggress
more often and mostly non-anonymously? Finally, we did not study the underlying dynamics
Fig 8. Online aggression dependent on controversy and anonymity (fixed-effects). Predictions of
Table 2, Model 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155923.g008
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of online firestorms. Under which circumstances, for example by enforcing which kind of
norm and by which framing of sanctions, can online aggressors in social media mobilize other
followers within hours?
To conclude, within the increasing penetration of digital media into public life, online
aggression has become an effective tool for punishing norm violations and securing public
goods. Academia and politics cannot ignore the social-political motivation of an aggressor
when investigating online aggression in social media. Also, in the debate on how to legally han-
dle online aggression, underlying social-political motivations must be taken into account in the
tightrope walk between securing free expression of opinion and preventing hate speech. And
finally, from an ethical perspective, altruistic punishments of norm violations to secure public
goods are honorable. However, the question arises whether the aggressive means of punish-
ments as obtained in firestorms are justified.
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